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However that court accorded standing to the taxpayer to bring
suit questioning the legality of police jury action in "closing"
a portion of what had been a park area for the purpose of additional public buildings. It found no "closing" but noted that taxpayers have the right to resort to judicial authority to restrain
their public servants from transcending their powers where there
is evidence (not present in this case) that the result thereof
would be to increase the burden of taxation or otherwise injuri44
ously affect the taxpayer.

PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.*
General Appearance
If, after filing a declinatory exception alleging lack of jurisdiction, and insufficiency of citation and service of process, the
defendant files notice of the taking of a deposition, has he made
a general appearance thereby waiving all objections to jurisdiction? This issue was raised in Stelly v. Quick Manufacturing,
Inc.,I and the court ruled that the defendant had made a general
appearance because the depositions were concerned with the
merits of the case and were not limited to the objections as to
citation and service of process which had been raised in the
declinatory exception. Therefore, in taking the deposition, the
defendant was seeking relief other than that permitted in article
7 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
Although it may be argued that the defendant had not asked
the court for any relief at all because he had not sought an
order from the court, the ruling seems to be consistent with the
intent of article 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure that if a defendant objects to jurisdiction, he must not voluntarily participate in the action except to challenge the jurisdiction of the
court or to seek the limited relief allowed under that article.
The filing of a notice of the taking of a deposition in preparation
for a trial on the merits, although not a request for relief, is
inconsistent with the non-resident defendant's position that he
44. Id. at 206-07.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 So.2d 548 (La. App. 8d Cir. 1969).
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should not be compelled to try the case in Louisiana. Also, it
should be noted that the depositions were filed in the record,
although the court did not give this as a reason for its decision.
This ruling presents certain problems for the defendant
and raises several questions. As a practical matter, the ruling
could put the defendant at a disadvantage in preparing his case
in the event his objections were overruled. If, as in the instant
case, the trial judge delays his decision on the defendant's objections for several months (in the instant case there was a nine
month interval between hearing and decision), the defendant
would not be able to use discovery to obtain statements from
witnesses and the other party while their memories were fresh
or to obtain a physical examination of the plaintiff before his
alleged injuries had healed. The case also presents certain legal
questions. If the plaintiff takes the deposition of the defendant
and inquires into the merits of the case, has the defendant made
a general appearance? This question was raised in the instant
case concerning interrogatories to the defendant, and the court
ruled that the answers did not constitute a general appearance
because the questions only dealt with the issue of jurisdiction.
Further, had the evidence not been obtained through the interrogatories, the defendant would have been entitled to present
it either by testimony or by deposition at the hearing on his
declinatory exception. This reasoning seems to imply that answers to interrogatories which pertained to the merits of the
case would have been a general appearance and objection to jurisdiction would have been waived. Presumably, the same result
would obtain if the defendant's deposition had been taken and
he had answered questions which pertained to the merits. In the
light of this case, it seems that a defendant who objects to jurisdiction or to the sufficiency of citation and service of process may
not use any of the discovery devices except to obtain evidence
on the issues raised by his declinatory exception, and if the
plaintiff uses discovery against him, he must refuse to participate if the plaintiff's inquiry is into the merits of the case. Under
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1421, the parties may
stipulate that a deposition be taken in any manner and upon
any notice, and it has been held that the use of this informal
discovery procedure will not be considered a step in the prosecution or defense of an action for the purpose of determining
whether an action has been abandoned. 2 But it is not certain
2. De Clouet v. Kanaas C. So. Ry., 176 So.2d 471 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965)
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whether the use of this procedure would be a general appearance.
The defendant would certainly argue that he has not asked the
court for any relief and that the taking of depositions in this
manner is not a formal proceeding but simply investigation in
preparation for trial. Whether this argument would be successful
after the Stelly case is not clear.
JurisdictionOver Status
Two recent cases have raised questions as to the sufficiency
of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure article 10, concerning
jurisdiction over status.
In the first case, Self v. Self,8 the husband filed suit for divorce on the grounds of adultery. The wife had moved to Texas
after obtaining a judgment of separation, and the alleged adultery had occurred in Texas. The wife made no appearance and
was represented by a court-appointed attorney. The trial court
granted the husband a judgment of divorce on the ground of
adultery but the court of appeal held that under Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 10 (7), Louisiana courts have no jurisdiction in this type of divorce suit. That article provides that a
Louisiana court would have jurisdiction in an action for divorce
only if one or both of the spouses are domiciled in the state
and the grounds occurred in Louisiana or while the matrimonial
domicile was in the state. Since the grounds had occurred in
Texas, the only possibility for jurisdiction rested on the presence
of the matrimonial domicile in the state. But the court reasoned
that the judgment of separation had ended the obligation of the
parties to live together, 4 and therefore the matrimonial domicile
had been extinguished. The wife, relieved of her obligation to
5
live with her husband, was free to establish a separate domicile.
In drafting the provisions for jurisdiction in divorce actions, the
redactors were concerned that residents of other states might
"wash their dirty marital linen" in Louisiana; article 10 (7) was
designed to prevent this.6 But these provisions can also prevent
3. 228 So.2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 120 provides: "The wife is bound to live with her
husband and to follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband
is obliged to receive her and to furnish her with whatever is required for
the convenience of life, in proportion to his means and condition."
5. See Bush v. Bush, 232 La. 747, 95 So.2d 298 (1957); Douglas v. Douglas,
146 So.2d 227 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).

6. McMahon, Jurisdiction Under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,
35 TUL. L. REV. 501, 518 (1961). See the cases cited in note 90 of the McMahon
article and in LA. CoDE Civ. P. art. 10, comment (I).
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Louisiana domiciliaries from having recourse to the courts of
their own state. While it is true that the husband in this case can
still obtain a divorce on the grounds of living separate and apart
for two years 7 because this is a recognized exception to the requirements of article 10 (7),8 the case does raise the question of
whether the provisions regulating jurisdiction in divorce actions
are too restrictive and ought to be modified to enable Louisiana
domiciliaries to have access to their courts while at the same
time preventing Louisiana from becoming a divorce center. The
Restatement of Conflicts, section 113, provides: "A state can
exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve the marriages
of spouses of whom one is domiciled within the state and the
other is domiciled outside the state if . . . (b) the state is the
last state in which the spouses were domiciled together as man
and wife." Such a provision would enable a Louisiana domiciliary
to obtain a divorce under the facts in Self, but would also be
sufficiently restrictive to serve Louisiana's policy concerning
divorce actions.' 0
In the second case, Stewart v. Stewart," the wife had moved
to Tennessee after obtaining a judgment of separation in Louisiana and had given birth to a child 189 days after the judgment. The husband filed suit for divorce on the grounds of adultery and sought disavowal of the child born in Tennessee and a
change of custody with respect to the children born before the
separation. The wife made no appearance and was represented by
court-appointed counsel who filed exceptions objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court. The trial court sustained the exceptions
with respect to the demands for change of custody and for disavowal, but held that the husband was not precluded from pursuing
his action for divorce on the grounds of adultery. 12 The husband
appealed and the appellate court affirmed. On the issue of cus7. LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950).

8. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 10(7) and comment (i) which states: "The exceptions referred to in Art. 10(7) are those sanctioned by Civil Code Art. 142
and R.S. 9:301."
9. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLCT or LAws § 113 (1934).

10. See note 6 supra.
11. 233 So.2d 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
12. With respect to the demand for divorce, the court of appeal noted
that the record did not disclose any evidence that plaintiff had proceeded
with that demand. But Louisiana would have no jurisdiction to grant a
divorce on the grounds of adultery because the grounds did not occur in
Louisiana or while the matrimonial domicile was in Louisiana. LA. CODE Crv.

P. art. 10(7); Self v. Self, 228 So.2d 548 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). He would
have to rely on LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950)-living separate and apart for two
years. LA. CODE Civ. P. 10(7),

comment (i).
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tody, the court based its decision on Code of Civil Procedure
article 10(5) which provides for jurisdiction in a custody proceeding if the minors are domiciled in the state or are physically
present in the state. The minors were not in the state and their
18
domicile was that of their mother which was in Tennessee.
The court also rejected the theory that Louisiana retains jurisdiction to decide custody questions even though the parent with
custody has left the state. 14 Since Civil Code article 250 provides
that "[u]pon divorce or judicial separation from bed and board of
parents, the tutorship of each minor child belongs of right to the
parent under whose care he or she has been placed or to whose
care he or she has been entrusted," the matter should have been
treated as a request for change of tutor. However, Louisiana
would still not have jurisdiction because article 10(4) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, dealing with tutorship, requires that
the minor be domiciled in Louisiana or have property in the
state. The decision is in accord with the express language of
Code of Civil Procedure article 10 (5) and recent cases. 15
On the issue of disavowal, the court stated that while Code
of Civil Procedure articles 6 and 10 applied, the plaintiff could
not meet the requirements of article 610 and article 10 had no
provision for an action to disavow. Since the action to disavow
is clearly an action to determine status, article 6 should not apply
because it is concerned with the authority of a court to render
a personal judgment against a defendant. But article 10, dealing
with jurisdiction over status, contains no provision for the action
13. LA. CIv. CODs art. 39: "[Tlhe domicile of a minor not emancipated is
that of his father, mother, or tutor ..
" See Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So.2d
395 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Nowlin v. McGee, 180 So.2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir.

1965).

14. The court relied on Nowlin v. McGee, 180 So.2d 72 (La. App. 2d Mr.
1965) and the cases cited in that decision, particularly Huhn v. Huhn, 224
La. 591, 70 So.2d 391 (1954).

15. Huhn v. Huhn, 224 La. 591, 70 So.2d 391 (1954); Pattison v. Pattison,
208 So.2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Lucas v. Lucas, 195 So.2d 771 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967); Nowlin v. McGee, 180 So.2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
16. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 6:
"Jurisdiction over the person is the legal power and authority of a
court to render a personal judgment against a party to an action or

proceeding. This jurisdiction must be based upon:
"(1) The service of process on the defendant, or on his agent for the
service of process;

"(2) The service of process on the attorney at law appointed by the
court to defend an action or proceeding brought against an absent or
incompetent defendant who is domiciled in this state; or
"(3) The submission of the party to the exercise of jurisdiction over

him personally by the court, or his express or implied waiver of objections thereto."
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to disavow. As the court noted, the question of jurisdiction in an
action to disavow seems to be res nova. This is probably because
the action is usually brought in a suit for divorce where it is
treated as an incidental issue to the principal demand 7 or because in prior actions all the parties were in Louisiana and the
issue was not raised.18 But now that the problem of finding a basis
for jurisdiction in an action to disavow has been raised, it should
be resolved by appropriate legislation amending article 10 to
provide for jurisdiction. As the court stated:
"There are equitable considerations advanced that the rights
of plaintiff are hollow indeed if he cannot proceed to have
the child disavowed in the courts of this state and he must
go to Tennessee to do so. However, equal consideration is due
the proposition that the child should not be required to
come to Louisiana to defend its paternity in view of the
very strong presumption in favor of its legitimacy . .

.19

Nonetheless, it is submitted that it would be appropriate for
Louisiana to base jurisdiction, in an action to disavow, on the
fact that the husband is domiciled in the state even though the
minor is not.20
Cumulation of Actions
In Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Gagnard21 plaintiff sued
to recover for damages sustained in an automobile accident; the
defendant reconvened for himself and as administrator of the
estate of his minor child to recover the damages they had sustained in the accident. The trial court sustained plaintiff's exception of no cause of action to the reconventional demand. The
court of appeal reversed reasoning that since an exception is
tried on the face of the petition, with all well pleaded allegations of fact accepted as true, the exception must be overruled
if the allegations set forth a cause of action. 22 In tort cases based
on negligence, this means that the exception will be overruled
17. See, e.g., Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952)

where an

attorney was appointed to represent the minor.
18. See, e.g., Feltus v. Feltus, 210 So.2d 388 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) where
an attorney was appointed to represent the minor. The husband had filed
his disavowal action against both his divorced wife and the minor child.
19. Stewart v. Stewart, 233 So.2d 305, 310 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
20. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 137 (1934): "The status of legitimacy is created by the law of the domicile of the parent whose relationship
to the child is in question."
21. 223 So.2d 233 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
22. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 931; Elliott v. Dupuy, 242 La. 173, 135 So.2d 54
(1961).
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unless it is clear from the evidence admissible under the petition
that the defendant could not be found negligent or that the
allegations in the petition establish the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff and exclude every reasonable hypothesis other
than that plaintiff's contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. 28 Applying these principles to defendant's
reconventional demand, the court ruled that the allegations
clearly stated a cause of action against the plaintiff. But, in the
same exception of no cause of action, the plaintiff had also objected to the defendant's bringing an action on behalf of his
child, arguing that the reconventional demand is only available
to a defendant and the child was not a defendant. 24 The court
correctly characterized the objection as one directed toward the
defendant's cumulating his and his daughter's actions and should
have been raised by the dilatory exception and not by the peremptory exception of no cause of action, particularly since the
allegations in the petition, if taken as true, clearly established a
cause of action in favor of the child. Since the plaintiff had not
waived his objection under the dilatory exception,2 5 the court
proceeded to determine the question of proper cumulation in
order to avoid a second appeal on this question. The court held
that the cumulation was proper because the defendant could have
intervened on behalf of his daughter because he was "demanding
similar relief against one of the principal parties arising out of
a right related to or arising out of the pending principal and
incidental actions." 26 The court reasoned that the incorrect designation of an incidental action as a reconventional demand should
not prevent the court from considering it as an intervention.2 The
court was also mindful of the general policy of the Code to favor
23. Gilliam v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 240 La. 697, 124 So.2d 913 (1960);
Johnson v. Aetna Ins. Co., 219 So.2d 563 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
24. LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 1061 provides: "The defendant in the principal

action may assert In a reconventional demand any action which he may
have against the plaintiff in the principal action . . . ." (Emphasis by plain-

tiff.)
25. The dilatory exception must be filed before answer and since the
plaintiff had not filed an answer to the reconventional demand, he could
still file the dilatory exception objecting to improper cumulation of actions.
LA. CoDs Crv. P. art. 928.
26. 223 So.2d 233,238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). LA. CODE Crv. P. aft. 1091
provides: "A third person having an Interest therein may intervene In a
pending action to enforce a right related to or connected with the object of
the pending action . . . ." See Bellow v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc., 215 So.2d 350 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).

27. Bellow v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc., 215 So.2d 350
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Treigle v. Patrick, 138 So.2d 652 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 31

judicial efficiency and to avoid a multiplicity of suits-a policy
reflected in the article permitting cumulation of actions where
there is a community of interest between the parties arising out
of the same factual issues 28 and in the article permitting joinder
29
of parties in a reconventional demand.
The court in Gagnard was correct both in its approach to
the problem and in its decision. When the court ruled that the
child's suit for damages could be determined in the principal
suit and that the incorrect designation of the incidental action
as a reconventional demand would not prevent the court from
considering it as an intervention, it was following the policy
of the Code that "[e]very pleading shall be so construed as to
do substantial justice."-" And in proceeding to determine the
issue of improper cumulation even though it had not been correctly raised in a dilatory exception, it was carrying out the intent of article 2164 which provides: "The appellate court shall
render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the
record of appeal."
In ruling that the intervention was proper, the court correctly applied article 1091 which provides: "A third person having an interest therein may intervene in a pending action to
enforce a right related to or connected with the object of the
pending action . . . by (1) Joining with plaintiff in demanding
the same or similar relief against the defendant."' 1 Since the
child was in fact a third party to the action even though suit
was filed on her behalf by the defendant, the intervention and
not the reconventional demand was the proper procedure for
asserting her demand. Clearly her right to damages arising out
of the same accident was related to the object of the principal
demand, and she was demanding similar relief from the plaintiff.
Had the defendant filed a separate suit against the plaintiff, the
28 LA. CODM CIV. P. art. 463, comment (c).
29. Ird. art. 1064.
80. 1d. art. 865. See also Treigle v. Patrick, 138 So.2d 652 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962).
31. The court also relied on Bellow v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc., 215 So.2d 350 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). For a restrictive interpretation of article 1091, see Resor v. Mouton, 200 So.2d 308 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1967) where the court refused to allow a third party to intervene in a suit
to recover for personal injuries because the third party was seeking recovery for property damage and not for personal injuries; therefore, his
right was not related to the object of the principal demand even though
both actions arose out of the same accident. The court in Resor distinguished
an earlier case, Emmco Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 237 La. 286, 111 So.2d
115 (1959), which had allowed an intervention to collect property damage
by reading it as being limited to actions under the direct action statute.
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child's action for damages could have been cumulated in that
suit because there was a community of interest between the
parties joined-the actions cumulated arose out of the same
facts and presented the same legal issue.3 2 The fact that the defendant filed an incidental action instead should not prevent the
same cumulation. There is nothing in the Code to preclude such
a result, and the public policy of avoiding a multiplicity of suits
favors such a procedure. Any problems presented by the cumulation can be handled by separate trials.83
Exception of No Right of Action
In American Bank & Trust Co. v. French,84 plaintiff bank,
as holder in due course, had filed suit on a promissory note executed by defendant. In its petition plaintiff alleged that the note
matured because the security given in connection with the note
had declined in value and the defendant had not furnished additional security. The note had been secured by funds on deposit
in defendant's savings account, but these funds had been withdrawn by the defendant's wife shortly before she and the defendant had separated. The defendant filed an answer in the form
of a general denial, reconvened for damages alleging that the
bank had committed an error and mistake when it had permitted
the wife to withdraw the funds, and filed an exception of no
right and no cause of action. The trial court sustained the exception of no right of action. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the exception was in effect a dilatory exception of prematurity
because of the language, "plaintiff had no right to institute proceedings against defendant at the time that it did,"3 5 and that it
could not be raised after answer had been filed.3 The court of
appeal admitted that the exception had certain overtones of prematurity, but rejected the argument that it was a dilatory exception urging prematurity alone, because to hold that would
cause a dismissal of plaintiff's suit unwarranted by the facts.
The court reasoned that since plaintiff had urged maturity of
the note and defendant had urged the maturity was the result
of the error and negligence of the plaintiff, both parties were
entitled to be heard on these complaints. The plaintiff's second
argument was that the defendant could not use the peremptory
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Civ. P. art. 463, comment (c).
Id. art. 1038.
226 So.2d 580 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
Id. at 583.
LA. CoDE Civ. P. art. 928.
LA. COD

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

exception of no right of action to raise the affirmative defenses
of error, mistake and estoppel. The court of appeal agreed reasoning that the defendant's answer and petition in reconvention set
forth the affirmative defenses of estoppel, error, and mistake;
therefore, the trial court was in error in sustaining the exception
of no cause or no right of action because such a judgment sanctions the dismissal of plaintiff's suit with prejudice8s Since the
defendant's exception had been styled both an exception of no
right and no cause of action and since the judgment did not
mention the objection of no cause of action, the court of appeal,
in order to remove any doubt as to the basis of the trial court's
ruling, found that the trial judge had acted on the exception of
no right of action. The court concluded that the evidence clearly
raised the issue of whether the alleged error or misconduct of
the plaintiff estopped it from bringing the action and that this
was sufficient to overcome a peremptory exception of no right
of action.
While the decision is correct in its result, it is not as precise
as it could be and contains some misleading statements. The
court correctly characterized the exception as not being the
dilatory exception of prematurity but gave as its reason the fact
that it would have to dismiss the plaintiff's suit if it were to
rule otherwise. If the court had found that the exception was, in
fact, the dilatory exception of prematurity, it would have had
to overrule the exception as untimely filed because all objections
which may be raised under the dilatory exception, such as prematurity, are waived if not pleaded before answer and this exception had been filed after answer." Clearly, if the plaintiff's
allegation of fact were taken as true, it had stated a cause of
action, and the exception of no cause of action had to be overruled. On the exception of no right of action, the court, after stating that the exception is used to test the plaintiff's interest in the
suit, also stated that it is used to test whether the plaintiff is under
some disability, such as minority or interdiction. The court concluded, "Simply stated the exception of no right of action tests
the capacity of the plaintiff.' ' 9 In making this statement the
court failed to distinguish the dilatory exception of lack of procedural capacity4° which tests the plaintiff's capacity to sue and
the peremptory exception of no right of action which is used
37. The court relied on LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 934.
38. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 928.

39. 226 So.2d 580, 584 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
40. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 926 (6).
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to inquire into the plaintiff's interest in the cause of action. 4' In
this case, the plaintiff, as holder in due course, had sufficient
interest in the cause of action (enforcing a promissory note) so
that he had a right to file suit to enforce that note. The fact that
the defendant may have a defense which bars recovery such as
mistake, error, or estoppel does not prevent the plaintiff from
bringing his action. This should have been the basis for overruling the exception of no right of action, and it should have
been clearly stated in order to avoid confusion as to the proper
function of that exception. In view of the court's statement that
the exception of no right of action simply tests the capacity of
the plaintiff, its conclusion that the evidence raises a question
of whether the bank is estopped to bring the action and that,
"[t]hese well pleaded facts are sufficient to overcome a peremptory exception of no right of action," 42 is too imprecise and
could be misleading. It is clear from the Code of Civil Procedure
that the defenses raised by the defendant in this case, error, mistake, and estoppel, must be pleaded in the answer. Comment (c)
under article 927 provides that since estoppel is available to the
plaintiff as well as to the defendant, it cannot be treated exclusively as an exception, and therefore, " . . . it is required that
estoppel be pleaded . . . by the defendant as an affirmative de-

fense." And article 1005 provides: "The answer shall set forth
affirmatively ...

error or mistake, estoppel ..

.

Motion for Summary Judgment
In Stevens v. State Mineral Board,4 when the plaintiff filed
a suit to remove a cloud from his title in the form of a mineral
lease, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on
two principal grounds: (1) that the plaintiff title was defective
because the property in question was the bed of a navigable
waterway and thus could not have been validly alienated by the
state, and (2) that the property had been adjudicated to the
state for taxes in 1932 and so the attempted redemption was invalid because article IV, section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution
prohibits the state from alienating the bed of any navigable
waterway. The trial judge rendered judgment on the motion,
and the court of appeal affirmed. 44 In the supreme court plaintiff
41. Id. art. 927, comment (b) (5) and cases cited therein.
42. American Bank & Trust Co. v. French, 226 So.2d 580, 585 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1969).
43. 255 La. 857, 233 So.2d 542 (1970).

44. 221 So.2d 645 (LA. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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argued that the judgment was incorrect on the merits and that
the case could not be disposed of on a motion for summary judgment. The court reversed on the grounds that the use of summary
judgment had been improper. The court was in doubt as to
whether there was a genuine issue of material fact because defendants, while insisting that there were no genuine issues of
fact, also stated that if the judgment were reversed there would
have to be a remand to decide the questions of fact that they
would raise in their answer. The defendants also insisted that
in a motion for summary judgment a party may present only
part of his case, admitting certain facts only for the purpose of
the motion and that, if he loses on the motion, he may start over
and make a different and even contrary factual presentation.
The court rejected defendant's arguments, reasoning that this
would lead to piecemeal trials and that it would also eliminate
the exception of no cause of action.
The purpose of the motion for summary judgment is to
determine whether, in the light of the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, there
is a genuine issue of fact.45 If there is, the issue must be resolved
by the trier of fact. Summary judgment does more than the
exception of no cause of action which simply tests the sufficiency
of the plaintiff's pleadings; it examines the available evidence to
determine whether there should be a trial on the factual issues
presented in the pleadings. While the court was correct that the
motion should not take the place of the exception of no cause
of action, it does not necessarily follow that a party may not
admit certain facts only for the motion and that, if he loses and
there is a trial on the issues of fact, he may not present his view
of the facts unhindered by what he was willing to admit on the
motion for summary judgment. Where, for example, he bases his
defense on a different legal theory from that asserted in his
motion, he should be able to present his facts without being
bound by what he had admitted for the motion. On the other
hand, if his answer raises the same legal issues as his motion, it
would not be unfair to require him to stand by the admissions of
fact he had made in support of his motion for summary judgment.

In rejecting the use of summary judgment, the court stated
that a motion for summary judgment was intended to be used

only in cases "where such judgment disposes of the entire case." 46
45. LA. CODz Civ. P. art. 966.
46. 255 La. 857, 870, 233 So.2d 542, 547 (1970).
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This statement is in clear conflict with the Code. Article 966
states that either party may move for summary judgment in his
favor "for all or part of the relief for which he has prayed." The
fact that the Code intended that the motion for summary judgment be used even though it does not dispose of the entire case
is also revealed in article 968 which, in speaking of judgments
on the pleadings and summary judgments, provides: "If the
judgment does not grant mover all of the relief prayed for,
jurisdiction shall be retained in order to adjudicate on mover's
right to the relief not granted on motion." Rather than leading
to piecemeal trials as the supreme court feared, the use of summary judgment will expedite the actual trial by eliminating
uncontested issues. If other courts follow the position taken in
Stevens and allow summary judgment only where it would dispose of the entire case rather than as intended by the Code to
grant all or part of the relief prayed for, much of its value will
have been lost unnecessarily.
Incidental Actions
In Hebert v. ArmsteadO plaintiff filed suit to collect for
damages sustained in an automobile accident. The suit was filed
shortly before the one-year prescriptive period had elapsed. The
defendant reconvened for damages sustained in the same accident, and the plaintiff filed a peremptory exception of prescription because the one-year period had run when the defendant
filed his petition in reconvention. The trial court sustained the
exception and the court of appeal affirmed. The decision was
clearly correct because the rules of prescription apply to all
actions whether they are filed as principal actions or as incidental actions. As Civil Procedure article 1034 provides: "A
defendant in an incidental action may plead any of the exceptions available to a defendant in a principal action, and may
raise any of the objections enumerated in Articles 925 through
927." Prescription is one of the objections enumerated in article
927. While the decision was correct under the law as it existed
at that time, it does raise the question of whether such a result
is desirable. One party could take advantage of another simply
by waiting until prescription has almost run before filing his
suit thereby leaving the defendant, who may have thought that
there would be no lawsuit over the dispute, with only a pre47. 227 So.2d 636 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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scribed cause of action to use as a defense.4 Possibly with this
in mind the legislature recently added article 106749 to the Code
of Civil Procedure which provides: "A reconvention is not barred
by prescription if it was not barred at the time the main demand
was filed; provided such reconvention is filed within ninety
days of date of service of main demand." Under this new article
if the situation in Hebert were to arise again, the defendant
would be able to file his reconventional demand and not be
barred by prescription.
Amendment of Pleadings
In Hancock Bank v. Alexander" plaintiff sued defendants to
collect on a note and prayed for sequestration of an automobile
owned by the defendants because it was within the power of
the defendants to sell, dispose of, waste, or remove the property
during the action. The defendants moved to dissolve the writ
of sequestration on the grounds that the petition failed to allege
that the plaintiff had a privilege or mortgage on the property
sequestered. 51 The trial court refused to dissolve the writ and
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendants appealed and the court of appeal affirmed. The
defendants argued that defects in writs granting provisional
relief cannot be cured by amendments-an argument supported
by cases decided before the new Code of Civil Procedure. 52 The
court rejected this argument, relying upon article 1154, which
provides: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be tried
in all respects as if they had been raised by the pleading."
When evidence of the mortgage was introduced without objec48. LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 424 provides: "A prescribed obligation may be
used as a defense if it is incidental to, or connected with, the obligation
sought to be enforced by the plaintiff."
49. La. Acts 1970, No. 472, § 1.
50. 227 So.2d 183 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
51. LA. COD9 CIV. P. art. 3571 provides: "When one claims the ownership
or right to possession of property, or a mortgage, lien or privilege thereon,
he may have the property seized under a writ of sequestration, if it is within
the power of the defendant to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or
the revenue therefrom, or remove the property from the parish, during the
pendency of the action."
52. Terzia v. The Grand Leader, 176 La. 151, 145 So. 363 (1932); Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Sloat, 91 So.2d 412 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956);
Salter v. Walsworth, 167 So. 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936). See also McMahon,
The Exception of No Ca4se of Action in Louisiana, 9 Tuh L. Rsv. 17, 51
(1934).
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tion,5 3 this had the effect of amending the petition and curing
any defect as to the issuance of the writ of sequestration. The
court concluded that article 1154 legislatively overruled the
cases relied upon by the defendants which had held to the contrary. The decision reached a just result in its liberal approach
to the question of amendments to the pleadings. 4 To have held
otherwise would have meant that, in similar cases, the writ would
be dissolved because of a defect in the petition and the plaintiff
would simply file a new petition alleging the mortgage, probably on the same day as the dismissal of the first petition, and
the property would be sequestered again. Such a result is
unjustified where there is evidence that the plaintiff does in fact
have a privilege or mortgage. There is no prejudice to the
defendant because he can use the motion to dissolve to determine
whether, in fact, the plaintiff has a right to sequester his property. Decisions concerning the validity of writs granting provisional relief, such as sequestration, ought to be based on evidence
and not on the preciseness of pleadings. As article 865 provides:
"Every pleading shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."
Furthermore, the liberal reading given to article 1154 is in accord
with article 5051 which provides: "The articles of this Code
are to be construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact
that rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are
not an end in themselves."
Despite the persuasiveness of the position taken by the court
of appeal, the supreme court reversed, 55 holding that the articles
dealing with the requirements for the issuance of the conservatory writs will not permit an amendment once the defendant
has moved to dissolve the writ.5 The court reasoned that since
the seizure takes place on the petition of the plaintiff, all the
defendant can do is to file a motion to dissolve. His damage has
already occurred because his property has already been seized;
hence, it is too late to cure defects after the seizure. This reasoning overlooks the fact that the seizure is only unlawful and
53. The evidence of the mortgage was introduced at the hearing on
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
54. See Tate, Amendment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 TUL L. Rnv. 211
(1969).
55. Hancock Bank v. Alexander, 256 La. 643, 237 So.2d 669 (1970).
56. LA. CoDn Civ. P. arts. 3501, 3571. The court also relied on the comment under article 1154 that the article merely codified the prior jurisprudence. The court interpreted this to mean that the earlier case prohibiting amendment to cure defects on conservatory writs had not been overruled as the court of appeal had concluded. These cases are cited in note
52 supra.
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the defendant is only entitled to damages if the plaintiff had no
right to seize the property. Where the plaintiff has a right to
sequester the property, because he has a privilege or mortgage
on the property and the defendant has the power to dispose
of the property, then the seizure is not unlawful even though
the plaintiff may not have pleaded correctly. In such cases the
court should look beyond the defects in the pleadings to determine whether the party has been prejudiced because of the
defects in the pleadings, and the procedure should be overturned
only when there has been prejudice which cannot be cured in
any other way. The court remanded the case to try the motion
to dissolve in accordance with the views expressed and to allow
the defendant to introduce evidence of the damages he had
sustained because of the unlawful sequestration. This decision is
based on the technicalities of pleading which is contrary to the
intent of the Code5 and ignores the substantive right of the
plaintiff to obtain that sequestration because he did in fact have
a mortgage on the property.
Supplemental Pleadings
In Collins v. Richland Aviation Service, Inc.,"" after the
plaintiff had obtained a judgment against the defendant corporation, the defendant filed a pleading giving notice that the
corporation, which had been cast in judgment, had been dissolved. The plaintiff then filed a supplemental petition against
two individuals alleging that the corporate entity had been
ignored by these individuals and that they had run the business
as an individual operation and, in the alternative, if the corporate entity had been maintained, then these two individuals,
who were the sole stockholders, officers and directors, were liable
to the extent of any sums received in the liquidation of the
corporation because they had dissolved the corporation when
there was an outstanding claim against it. The trial court overruled the defendants' exceptions of no right and no cause of
action and their motion to strike the supplemental petition.
The court of appeal, on writ of certiorari, affirmed. The court
held that the plaintiff had a cause of action against stockholders
and officers who had received the assets of a corporation which
57. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 865 and 5051 quoted in the text at p. 357 supra.
58. 225 So.2d 241 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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had been dissolved while there was a claim pending against it59
and approved of the use of the supplemental petition to allow
the plaintiff to assert his cause of action because the cause of
action was related to the cause of action asserted in the original
petition and had arisen subsequent to the filing of the original
0 The court's approach seems in accord with the objecpetition.3
tives of the Code in providing for supplemental pleadings. It
allows the plaintiff to assert his cause of action as quickly and
inexpensively as possible without causing any prejudice to the
defendants who would still have all of the delays and defenses
which would have been available to them if the plaintiff had
filed a separate suit against them. Since the cause of action is
related to that asserted in the original petition, it is appropriate
that it be tried in the same action. The alternative to the approach
allowed in this case would be a multiplicity of actions which
should be avoided wherever possible.
The defendants also objected because the court had allowed
the filing of the supplemental petition without giving them
notice. The court agreed that as a general rule the requirement
of reasonable notice in article 1155 would mean a contradictory
motion and a hearing before allowing the supplemental pleading"1 but that, in this case, the defendants had suffered no
prejudice because their objections were considered in the hearing on their exceptions and the motion to strike. In deciding this
question the court applied the correct standard. The decision
should not be based on simply whether the procedures outlined
by the Code had been followed but rather on whether the deviation from the general rule had caused prejudice to the party
opposing the procedure. If there was no prejudice, then the
procedure should stand even though the Code had not been
followed precisely. To overturn a procedure where there was
no showing of prejudice would be to interpret the Code in a
very technical manner-an approach expressly rejected by the
Code itself which declares: "The articles of this Code are to be
59. The court of appeal relied on Fudickar v. Inabnet, 176 La. 777, 146
So. 745 (1933) and Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works, 182 So. 365 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1938).
60. IA. CODS Cv. P. art. 1155: "The court, on motion of a party, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, may permit mover to

file a supplemental petition or answer setting forth items of damage, causes
of action or defenses which have become exigible since the date of filing the
original petition or answer, and which are related to or connected with
the causes of action or defenses asserted therein."
61. id. Wallace v. Hanover Ins. Co., 164 So.2d 111 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1964).
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construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact that rules
of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end
in themselves." 62 Moreover, article 1155 gives the court the discretion to allow the supplemental pleadings "under such terms
as are just."
Involuntary Dismissal
In two cases, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal dealt
with the meaning of article 1672 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which provides: "A judgment dismissing an action shall be
rendered upon application of any party, when the plaintiff fails
to appear on the day set for trial." In the first case, Levy v.
Stelly, 68 the plaintiff had filed two suits on the same cause of
action in state and federal courts. When the case in state court
was called for trial the plaintiff requested an indefinite continuance, stating that he did not want to try the case in state
court but intended to proceed with the action in federal court
and that the only reason he wanted a continuance was to preserve his rights against prescription because the action in federal
court had been filed after the prescriptive period had run. The
trial court dismissed his suit without prejudice. The court of
appeal reversed on different grounds0 4 but discussed the effect
of a valid dismissal on plaintiff's suit in federal court, because
the defendant had filed a motion to dismiss in federal court
alleging that prescription had run because the dismissal was for
failure to prosecute and therefore, under Civil Code article
3519,65 the interruption is considered as never having happened.
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the dismissal
had been for failure to appear under Code of Civil Procedure
article 1672 and that such a dismissal is not within the purview
of Civil Code article 3519. The court concluded that even if the
judgment had been validly rendered, the judgment would be
incorrect because the plaintiff did appear when he asked for
a continuance and this would be sufficient, under article 1672, to
defeat a motion to dismiss. The court interpreted article 1672
to simply require an appearance in court.
62. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 5051.
63. 230 So.2d 774 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
64. The judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit was held to be invalid because the plaintiff was not properly named In the judgment.
65. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3519 provides: "If the plaintiff . . . fails to prosecute [his demand] at the trial, the interruption is considered as never having happened."
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In a later case, Lewis v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc.,66 the court of appeal rejected this dicta." The trial
court had rejected plaintiff's request for a continuance and, on
the same day, had dismissed his case with prejudice when he
was unable to proceed to trial. The court of appeal affirmed
and interpreted article 1672 to require that a plaintiff not only
appear but that he proceed with his case if ordered to do so.
The court reasoned that if a trial judge had no authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute at trial, then his authority to deny
continuances would be meaningless. The court's interpretation
was supported by the fact that article 1672 was not intended
to change the prior law and article 536 of the Code of Practice
had provided: "If, after the cause has been set down on the
docket for trial, the plaintiff does not appear, either in person
or by attorney, to plead his cause, on the day fixed for trial,
the defendant may require that judgment of nonsuit be rendered
against such plaintiff, with costs." The interpretation given to
article 1672 by the court in Lewis is clearly the correct one and
is in harmony with Civil Code article 3519 which provides that
the interruption is considered as never having happened if the
plaintiff fails to prosecute his demand at the trial. The very
literal interpretation given to article 1672 by the court in Levy
would make it possible for a plaintiff to prevent dismissal simply
by appearing in court without any intention of proceeding with
the trial. Such a result would be manifestly unfair to the
defendant and would destroy the court's discretion in granting
continuances. To avoid this question in the future, article 1672
should be amended to provide that the plaintiff's suit will be
dismissed if he fails to plead his cause on. the day fixed for trial.
Jury Trials
In Talley v. Friedman8 plaintiff filed suit against defendants
to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident and
prayed for a jury trial. The defendants filed a third party demand
against the Department of Highways for contribution, and the
department filed an exception objecting to trial by jury.69 The
66. 233 So.2d 743 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
67. The court was also aware that its holding conflicted with dicta in
Maxie v. Hartford Ins. Co., 212 So.2d 165 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) and Berger
v. Johnson, 141 So.2d 164 (IL
App. 4th Cir. 1962).

68. 255 La. 735, 232 So.2d 495 (1970).
69. LA. R.S. 13:5104 (1960) provides:
public body shall be tried by jury."

"No suit against the state or other
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plaintiff moved for separate trials of the principal and incidental
demands, and the defendants filed a motion to strike plaintiff's
request for a jury trial. The trial court sustained the exception
of the Department of Highways and maintained the motion of
the defendants to strike the request for a jury trial. When the
court of appeal denied writs under its supervisory jurisdiction,
the plaintiff applied for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition to the supreme court which were granted.70 The supreme
court recognized the right of the state not to have any claim
against it tried by jury and tried to reconcile that right with
that of the plaintiff to have a trial by jury.7 1 The court concluded that it could give effect to both rights by ordering separate
trials of the principal and incidental demands. In reaching this
result, the court relied on article 1038 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides: "The court may order the separate
trial of the principal and incidental actions. . .

."

The court also

found support in articles 1734 and 1735 which allow the parties
to request a jury trial for certain issues. Although the defendant
relied on an earlier supreme court case which had held that
there could be no jury trial if the state were a co-defendant,72
the majority distinguished that case on the fact that there the
state was a co-defendant in the principal demand whereas in the
instant case it was a defendant in an incidental action. The
dissent argued that the prior case was controlling because in
both cases there was the possibility that the separate trials could
produce conflicting results. The dissent also argued that there
was but one law suit involving various demands and that if the
state were a party to that suit, then the statute prohibiting jury
trials when the state is a party must control as to the entire suit.
Separate trials would be circumventing the legislative mandate.
The majority reached the correct result because even though
there is the possibility that the separate trials might produce
inconsistent results, a party should not be deprived of his right
to a jury trial. With respect to the statute forbidding jury trials
in suits against the state or other public bodies, it is clear that
the legislature intended to provide that the liability of the state
could only be determined in a trial without jury. This mandate
would be carried out by ordering a separate trial on the defen70. 254 La. 827, 227 So.2d 372 (1969).

71. LA. R.S. 13:5104 (1960) and LA. COD

Cry. P. art. 1731 which provides:

"Except as limited by Article 1733, the right of trial by jury is recognized."

72. Jobe v. I-odge, 253 La. 483, 218 So,2d 566 (1969).
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dant's third party demand against the Department of Highways.
It would be the same result as if the defendant had filed a
separate suit against the Department for contribution.
Appeal
In Cunningham v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. 78 plaintiff
had filed suit against three defendants and their liability insurers.
Plaintiff compromised with one of the defendants and one of
his insurers, reserving his rights against all other defendants
including the other insurer of the defendant with whom he
compromised. Judgment was rendered against the plaintiff as to
all the defendants. Plaintiff appealed as did one of the defendants who demanded contribution from the other defendants
if the court of appeal reversed the trial court and cast them in
judgment. The issue was thus raised of whether a third party
demand may be asserted on appeal when no such action had
been initiated in the trial court. The court of appeal based its
decision on a prior supreme court case 74 which had held that
an appeal by one co-defendant brought the other defendant
before the appellate court even though the plaintiff had not
appealed from the judgment dismissing that defendant and
that such an appeal was tantamount to filing a third party
demand.
Ordinarily, a demand for contribution must be initiated by
a petition filed in the trial court.75 If the third party demand
could be asserted for the first time on appeal, then the appellate
court could be faced with issues which had never been presented
or passed upon by the trial court. Since there would be no
judgment to review on those issues, the appellate court would
ordinarily remand the case to allow the trial court to render
judgment on those issues. To do otherwise the appellate court
would be functioning as a trial court with respect to the third
party demand. But in this particular case, the action of the
appellate court was justified because all of the issues involved
in the third party demand-the liability of the defendants and
the amount of the damages-were before the appellate court. But
73. 228 So.2d 700 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
74. Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So.2d 594 (1963).
But see Williams v. City of Baton Rouge, 252 La. 770, 214 So.2d 188 (1968),
discussed in The Work of the Loui4ana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969
Term--Civil Procedure 30 LA. L. R v. 286, 806 (1969).
75. LA. CODE Crv. P. arts. 1032, 1111.
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the practice of allowing third party demands to be filed for the
first time on appeal should be strictly limited to those cases
where the third party demand presents no new issues. In many
cases, one defendant could have a valid defense to his codefendant's claim for contribution, and in those situations the
demand for contribution should be asserted in a separate action
or by the third party demand filed in the trial court, and not
asserted for the first time on appeal.
Martin v. Martin8 raised the question of when the appeal
bond must be filed in a devolutive appeal from a city court in
cases over $100.00. At the time of the decision, article 5002
provided that the suspensive appeal bond must be filed within
ten days of the denial of a new trial or within ten days after
the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial, but
the article was silent as to the delays for filing the bond in a
devolutive appeal. The court ruled that the delays for filing
a suspensive appeal bond did not apply to the filing of a devolutive appeal bond and relied on the principle of statutory construction that the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other
to support its conclusion. Since article 5002 did not apply, the
court used article 5001 which provides: "Except as otherwise
provided in Article 5002, the procedure in a civil case in a city
court of which a justice of the peace does not have concurrent
jurisdiction is the same as that provided by law for a civil case
in the district court of the parish in which the municipality is
situated." The court applied article 2087 which governs the delays
for filing a devolutive appeal bond in district court cases and
ruled that the appeal bond had been timely filed. The decision
correctly applied articles 5001, 5002, and 2087, but subsequent
to this decision article 5002 was amended to cover this situation
and now provides: "The devolutive appeal bond, as required by
the applicable provisions of Article 2124, must be filed within the
delays allowed above for a devolutive appeal." Thus, the delays
for filing the devolutive appeal bond are the same as those provided for filing the suspensive appeal bond-within ten days after
the expiration of the delays for applying for a new trial or
within ten days of the denial of a new trial. The amendment has
the effect of overruling the result reached in Martin.
76. 228 So.2d 355 (1a. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
77. Id. at 358. "[I]nclusio untus est exclusio alterius."

